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NOTE
Houses Built on Sand: Police Expert
Testimony in California Gang Prosecutions;
Did Gardeley Go Too Far?
by PATRICK MARK MAHONEY*
I. Introduction
In the 1980's, the California legislature declared that California
was in a "state of crisis" caused by gang members who "threaten,
terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful
citizens of their neighborhoods.'." The legislature found that there
were nearly 600 criminal street gangs operating in California.2 In Los
Angeles alone, there were 328 gang-related murders in 1986.' In
1997, the California Supreme Court found that crimes committed by
gangs such as "[m]urder, attempted murder, drive-by shootings,
assault and battery, vandalism, arson, and theft [remained]
commonplace.
' 4
Law enforcement agencies and courts were frustrated in their
attempts to eradicate criminal gang activity through traditional
criminal prosecution techniques This frustration was due in large
part to the organizational structure of gangs and "their willingness to
use violence to achieve their ends. ',6 Common problems that district
. Juris Doctor 2004, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090, 1100 (1997) (describing the
Rockspings area of San Jose).
5. Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 31, 31-32 (1998).
6. David R. Truman, Note, The Jets and Sharks Are Dead: State Statutory Responses
to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH U. L.Q. 683, 685 (1995).
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attorneys faced when prosecuting gang-related crimes included gang
codes of silence, witness intimidation, and the restrictions of juvenilecodes.7
In 1988, California enacted Penal Code part 1, title 7, chapter 11,
the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act ("STEP"),8
becoming the first state to pass legislation aimed specifically at the
problem of criminal street gangs.9 STEP was passed as part of an
overall attempt to deal with those frustrations that existed at the
prosecutorial level.1" The legislature hoped that the criminal behavior
of the gangs could be eradicated by focusing upon "patterns of
criminal gang activity and upon the organized nature of street
gangs."'1 STEP was not considered to be a final solution to the gang
crisis, but rather was viewed as a tool that prosecutors and law
enforcement could implement against gangs.12
With the passage of STEP, California courts began to gradually
expand the scope of evidence admissible to prove gang membership
and to loosen the restrictions on expert testimony regarding gang
behavior. 3 California courts allowed police officers, qualified as
experts, to give opinions based on hearsay evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible. In People v. Gardeley, for example, the
California Supreme Court upheld an extremely broad view of
permissible uses of expert testimony.'
This note will argue that the California Supreme Court went too
far in approving the broad scope of police expert testimony in
Gardeley. Under the guise of giving the reasons for his expert
opinion, a police officer was permitted to relate to the jury otherwise
inadmissible hearsay evidence of the defendant's prior criminal acts
and criminal acts committed by alleged associates. The Court
allowed some of this hearsay testimony to be admitted substantively
to prove one of the elements of STEP.15 In addition to this negative
7. James Blake Sibley, Note, Gang Violence: Response of the Criminal Justice System
to the Growing Threat, 11 CRIM. JUST. J. 403,406 (1989).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.33 (West 2003).
9. Bjerregaard, supra note 5, at 32.
10. Sibley, supra note 7, at 406-07.
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21.
12. Raffy Astvasadoorian, Note, California's Two-Prong Attack Against Gang Crime
and Violence: The Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act and Anti-Gang
Injunctions, 19 J. Juv. L. 272, 273 (1998).
13. Sibley, supra note 7, at 404.
14. 14 Cal. 4th 605, 618-20 (1997).
15. Id. at 619-20.
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character evidence, the officer was allowed to give an opinion on the
ultimate issue of the case, instructing the jury on precisely how the
defendant's conduct should be interpreted. 6
The struggle between the individual's right of liberty and
society's liberty is at the heart of California's gang dilemma." In
Gardeley, the California Supreme Court missed a critical opportunity
to reemphasize California's restrictive view of expert testimony and
the importance of judicial gatekeeping. Undoubtedly, police officers
qualified as experts give prosecutors a powerful tool to use in criminal
gang prosecutions. Although gang violence remains a large problem
plaguing our communities, we as a society should not overlook
traditional rules of evidence and an individual's constitutional
confrontation rights in an all-out attempt to eradicate street gangs.
II. STEP
STEP established a new crime of participation in a criminal
street gang, punishable by up to one year in a county jail or one to
three years in state prison."' Under STEP, "any person who is
convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent
to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members" is guilty of a criminal offense. 9
A "criminal street gang," as defined by the act, is any ongoing
association of three or more persons that shares a common
name or common identifying sign or symbol; has as one of its
"primary activities" the commission of specified criminal
offenses; and engages through its members in a "pattern of
criminal gang activity. "20
A "pattern of criminal gang activity" means that gang members have
committed (within a certain time frame) two or more of the 25
enumerated predicate offenses.2 Additionally, a violation of STEP is
a substantive offense that provides for sentence enhancements in
16. Id.
17. Astvasadoorian, supra note 12, at 272.
18. Truman, supra note 6, at 707.
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1) (West 2003).
20. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610.
21. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(e) (West 2003) (including assault with a deadly
weapon, robbery, homicide, shooting at an inhabited dwelling or vehicle, arson, the sale of
drugs, intimidation of witnesses and possession of a firearm).
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addition and consecutive to the punishment normally prescribed for
that particular felony." Further, enhancements are possible for gang
members who commit felonies on or near school grounds.'
The California legislature did not create new evidentiary rules
with the passage of STEP. Nevertheless, STEP gave prosecutors a
vehicle to introduce a broad range of evidence that would otherwise
be excluded under traditional hearsay rules. Generally, evidence of
gang membership or a defendant's prior bad acts cannot be admitted
to show the defendant's criminal propensities or conformity with the
current crime charged." Since proof of gang membership and prior
crimes committed by gang members are specific elements of the
substantive offense created by STEP, however, this evidence is
allowed in. Furthermore, traditional rules excluding the introduction
of hearsay evidence move aside under the expert testimony rule.5
In the early days of STEP, prosecutors often had difficulty
demonstrating the required pattern of gang activity." One might
assume from the statute that the term "pattern" means that the
defendant had a practice of committing illegal acts, or had done so on
at least two occasions. However, California courts have concluded
that a "pattern of criminal activity" can be established by
demonstrating that the defendant was involved in two or more
incidents, or by demonstrating that multiple offenders committed one
or more offenses in a single incident .... "28 Further still, Gardeley
holds that both offenses do not have to be gang related.29 As one
commentator pointed out,
this means that in California, a juvenile who has sustained a
previous juvenile petition prior to gang involvement will be
eligible for prosecution under STEP once it is demonstrated
that he had committed one of the enumerated crimes, regardless
of whether this individual acted alone or in the company of other
gang members.3°
22. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610.
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(2) (West 2003).
24. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2003); see Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
3d 441, 448 (1984).
25. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 2003).
26. Bjerregaard, supra note 5, at 46.
27. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 2003).
28. Id.
29. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 621 (1997).
30. Bjerregaard, supra note 5, at 45 (emphasis added).
[31:3
Spring 2004] EXPERT TESTIMONY IN CALIFORNIA GANG PROSECUTIONS 389
It is difficult to see how characterizing one illegal act committed
without accompaniment as a pattern of criminal activity specifically
addresses California's gang crisis.3'
III. People v. Gardeley
People v. Gardeley represents a typical use of police expert
testimony in a STEP prosecution.32 In August 1992, around 2 a.m.,
Rochelle Lonel Gardeley, Tommie James Thompson, and Tyronne
Watkins approached Edward Bruno, who had the misfortune of
stopping to urinate in the carport of an apartment complex
"controlled by the Family Crip gang."33 The defendants robbed and
beat Bruno, at one point breaking a large rock over his head.34 A
short time later, police officers stopped and searched a car in which
Thompson was driving and Gardeley was a passenger.33 The police
recovered a small bag of cocaine and observed that Gardeley had a
bloody lip and blood on his shirt.36
Gardeley and Thompson were charged with attempted murder,
assault with a deadly weapon, and robbery.37 Additionally, each of
these offenses was alleged to have violated STEP.38 At trial, the
prosecution presented eyewitnesses and physical evidence regarding
the attack on Bruno.39 Then, the prosecution called Detective Boyd,
as an expert witness, to testify on gang practices.4' Detective Boyd
had 23 years of experience in the investigation of criminal street
gangs and had interviewed both Thompson and Gardeley after their
arrests.4' He had also interviewed Tyrone Watkins, Bruno's third
assailant, who had been charged with Gardeley and Thompson, but
pled to a lesser charge before trial.42 When the prosecutor asked
31. Id.
32. See People v. Killebrew, 103 Cal. App. 4th 644, 657 (2002) (citing extensive list of
criminal gang cases using expert testimony).
33. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 610.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 611.
36. Id.
37. Id.





390 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [31:3
Detective Boyd what Watkins had told him, the defense counsel
objected on hearsay grounds. 3
The prosecutor stated that he sought to elicit testimony from
Detective Boyd "not for the truth of the matter asserted," but to give
the jury the facts that formed the basis of his expert opinion." The
trial court held a hearing out of the presence of the jury to allow the
prosecution to make an offer of proof about the hearsay evidence
that he intended to present." The prosecutor stated that he intended
to have Detective Boyd testify about the facts surrounding the crimes
upon which the prosecutor intended to establish the necessary pattern
of criminal activity and predicate offenses." During this hearing,
Detective Boyd admitted that his opinion was not based on any
personal knowledge.47 Rather, he could only summarize information
given to him by other officers and gang members. '
The trial court ruled that such evidence was admissible and
qualified Detective Boyd as a gang expert.49 The trial court told the
prosecutor that the hearsay "cannot be considered for the truth of the
matter, but can be considered as it related to the expert opinion."5
The court then informed the jury that hearsay evidence would be
admitted and gave them the limiting instruction that they "may not
consider those statements for the truth of the matter, but only as they
give rise.., to the expert opinion.... "51
Detective Boyd testified that the defendants had told him they
were gang members and revealed their Family Crip names. 2 He also
gave opinion testimony that the gang's primary purpose was to sell
narcotics as well as engage in witness intimidation and violence "to
further its drug-dealing activities."53  After being presented with
hypothetical facts identical to the present case, Detective Boyd
opined that the defendant's actions were clearly gang-related and
43. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 611-12.
44. Id. at 612.
45. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 612.
46. People v. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (official




49. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 612.
50. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
51. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 612.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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performed for the purpose of securing the gang's drug-dealing
territory. 4
Finally, Detective Boyd attempted to establish the additional
required predicate offense by describing in detail three prior criminal
incidents.5  The first incident was a May 1993 shooting at an
apartment complex involving defendant Thompson and one Mario
Phipps. Detective Boyd confirmed that Mario Phipps was a Family
Crip gang member. 6 The second incident was a July 1989 incident
involving a "a threat against a drug dealer... by defendant Gardeley
and three other persons, whom Detective Boyd testified were
members of the Family Crip Gang. 7 The third incident related to the
jury involved a December 1987 arrest of Gardeley for drug
possession. 8 The trial court then allowed the prosecutor to admit
certified copies of the information charging Mario Phipps and
Gardeley, as well as abstracts of judgment documenting Phipps' and
Gardeley's convictions for the prior offenses charged in these
informations.59
A jury convicted defendants Gardeley and Thompson of
attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon.6° The jury
found that these offenses had been committed "for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang" and
Gardeley and Thompson were given sentences that included
enhanced penalties under STEP.61 The trial court sentenced Gardeley
to state prison for 17 years and Thompson to state prison for 9 years.6
Both defendants appealed their conviction. They contended that
the criminal street gang substantive offense and the STEP
enhancement were not supported by substantial evidence. 6
Additionally, each contended that admission of hearsay evidence
violated their constitutional right to confrontation' The Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions of attempted murder and assault
54. Id. at 613.
55. Id.
56. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 613.
57. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 613.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 613-14.
60. Id. at 614.
61. Id.
62. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 614..
63. People v. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
64. Id.
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with a deadly weapon, but reversed the criminal street gang
substantive offense and the gang related enhancements under STEP.65
The court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the two
or more predicate offenses required by statute to establish that
Gardeley and Thompson were members of a criminal street gang
within the meaning of the statute.66
The Court of Appeals was troubled that the prosecution chose to
rely on hearsay testimony despite the "explicit ruling by the trial
court that such testimony was inadmissible to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."67 The court noted that Detective Boyd admitted
that he was not testifying from personal knowledge, but was only
repeating what he had learned from gang members, other officers,
and what he had read in police reports.6 The court allowed that this
evidence was admissible to show the jury the basis of his expert
opinion.6' However, the court emphasized that this evidence was not
competent to serve as substantive proof of the required predicate
offenses.7' The court said that the elements of STEP, including the
"offenses necessary to satisfy the pattern requirement," must be
proven through competent evidence and that these predicate offenses
must be gang-related. 7' The court reasoned that "[t]o allow otherwise
would be to punish defendant for the unrelated actions of people with
whom he associated.
72
Specifically, the court stated that the prosecution had not proven
the required second predicate offense. On appeal, the State argued
that STEP's required pattern of criminal activity had been adequately
proven. 7' The first of the "two or more" enumerated offenses had
been proven through eyewitness and physical evidence of the attack
on Bruno. The State contended that the second offense had been
proven through a combination of the certified copy of the abstract of
judgment showing Mario Phipps' conviction for shooting into an
inhabited dwelling and Detective Boyd's testimony of the events
65. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 614.
66. Id.
67. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
68. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141.
69. Id. at 142.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 141.
72. Id.
73. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142.
74. Id.
[31:3
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surrounding that shooting.75
The court disagreed, stating that the abstract of judgment was
not proof that Mario Phipps' conviction was in anyway related to
Gardeley, Thompson, or the Family Crip gang.76 The court stated:
"The People ignore that Officer Boyd's recitation of the facts
surrounding this crime was hearsay admitted not for the truth of the
matter asserted, but merely as the basis for expert testimony."7
Furthermore, since the facts and assumptions that formed the basis
for Detective Boyd's opinion were not based on personal knowledge,
"those facts had to be proved by competent evidence elicited by other
witnesses and/or physical evidence., 78 Finally, the court admonished,
"while experts may offer opinions and the reasons for their opinions,
they may not under the guise of reasons bring before the trier of fact
incompetent hearsay evidence.
78
IV. The California Supreme Court Opinion
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
and reinstated Gardeley's and Thompson's STEP convictions.' The
California Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in
holding that the required predicate offenses have to be gang related.
The Court then found that the prosecution had proven the requisite
pattern of criminal activity through competent evidence.
The Court used Gardeley to reduce some of the confusion that
surrounded STEP prosecutions.83 The Court interpreted the STEP
legislation to mean that as long as the predicate crime is one of the
enumerated offenses, it does not have to be gang-related."
Furthermore, the Court clarified that the State can rely on the instant
offense as one of the two required predicate offenses.85 On its
75. Id. at 143.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 143.
79. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 144 (quoted in In re Nathaniel C., 228 Cal. App. 3d
990, 1003-04 (1991)).
80. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 626 (1997).
81. Id. at 610.
82. Id.
83. Pamela L. Schleher, California Supreme Court Survey April 1996 - July 1997, 25
PEPP. L. REV. 261, 265 (1997).
84. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 625 n.12.
85. Id. See also People v. Olguin, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1355, 1383 (1994).
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surface, the decision appears to be a rational interpretation of the
legislative intent behind the STEP statute. Certainly, Gardeley sends
a message that crimes committed in furtherance of gang activity will
be punished severely."' The Court erred, however, in stating that the
predicate crime did not have to have any relationship to the criminal
street gang.
Surely, though, the required predicate crime must have some
relationship to the defendants or the criminal street gang at issue.
Without Detective Boyd's hearsay testimony, there is nothing in the
record that links Phipps' conviction to Gardeley or the Family Crip
gang. In overlooking this fact, the Court missed a critical opportunity
to reexamine the use of police expert testimony in STEP
prosecutions.
V. Expert Testimony
The scope of permissible expert testimony has long been the
source of critical commentary. Even states that purport to strictly
regulate the type of evidence an expert is allowed to bring before a
jury struggle with several issues.' First, if police officers are allowed
to testify as experts, how strenuously should a trial judge test the
credibility of the underlying data on which the officer has based his
opinion?' 8 Second, if the court allows the officer to give his opinion,
should the officer be allowed to relate any hearsay evidence that
formed the basis of his in-court opinion?89 Finally, should the
underlying basis of the police officer's testimony be admissible as
substantive evidence? When police officers testify as expert witnesses
the inherent prejudicial dangers of expert testimony are magnified by
their official status.90 Furthermore, in criminal cases, police expert
testimony poses a serious risk to a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation. 91
Under the former common law system, expert witnesses were
allowed to state their opinions only on facts already admitted into
evidence or those gained from firsthand knowledge.92 The expert
86. Schleher, supra note 83, at 265.
87. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts, Judges, and Commentators: The Underlying Debate
About an Expert's Underlying Data, 47 MERCER L. REV. 481,482-83 (1996).
88. Id.
89. Carlson, supra note 87, at 483.
90. See infra Part VIII.
91. See infra Part VI.
92. Roberta N. Buratti, What is the Status of "Inadmissible" Bases of Expert
[31:3
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either attended the trial and listened to the witnesses or was asked a
hypothetical question based on evidence that had been introduced at
the trial.93 Hearsay problems were avoided because the experts were
limited to opinions based only on admissible evidence.94
In 1966, California adopted the first evidence code that allowed
experts to base their opinions on information that was not received
into evidence.95  California evidence law permits a person with
"special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" in a
particular field to qualify as an expert witness.96 Such an expert is
allowed to testify only if the subject matter of the testimony is
"sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of the
expert would assist the trier-of-fact." ' If a witness is testifying as an
expert, his testimony is limited to an opinion "based on matter...
perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to
him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a
type reasonably relied upon by an expert in forming an
opinion.... ,,9 A fair reading of California Evidence Code section
801 seems restrictive in its application to hearsay evidence. The
drafters intended that the use of inadmissible evidence would be
determined case-by-case and would not form the basis of all expert
testimony.99
Accordingly, expert opinions may be based on inadmissible
evidence only if it is material that is of a type reasonably relied upon
by other experts in their field."° Also, any material that forms the
basis of an expert's opinion must be reliable.10 1 Read together,.
California Evidence Code sections 720 and 801(b) mandate that trial
courts act as gatekeepers, screening expert testimony to ensure that
Testimony?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 531 (1994); JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 14 (4th ed. 1992).
93. Buratti, supra note 92, at 531.
94. Id. at 531-32.
95. Charles J. Walsh & Beth S. Rose,' Increasing the Useful Information Provided by
Experts in the Courtroom: A Comparision of Federal Rules of Evidence 703 and 803(18)
with the Evidence Rules in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 183,
196-97 (1995).
96. CAL. EVID. CODE § 720 (West 2003); People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 617
(1997).
97. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(a) (West 2003).
98. Id. § 801(b).
99. Walsh & Rose, supra note 95, at 197.
100. CAL. EVID. CODE § 801(b); Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 618.
101. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 618.
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its basis is reliable.'O° Courts have an obligation to limit expert
testimony to the area of the professed expertise and to require
reliable foundations for the opinion.03 If the articulated basis is not
reliable, then the opinion has no evidentiary value and must be
excludedP°4
As the California Supreme Court noted in Gardeley, "the law
does not accord to the expert's opinion the. same degree of credence
or integrity as it does the data underlying the opinion. Like a house
built on sand, the expert's opinion is no better than the facts on which
it is based."1 5 The trial court retains "considerable discretion" to
control the manner in which an expert is questioned in order to
prevent the jury from learning of incompetent hearsay.' Mere
recitation of sources on which an expert relied upon in making his
opinion "does not transform inadmissible matter into independent
proof."1°7
California Evidence Code section 802 allows an expert to "state
on direct examination the reasons for his opinion and the matter...
upon which it is based. .... "'0' However; section 802 does not address
whether or not those reasons may be received as independent
evidence. Even when gang evidence is relevant and admissible under
a specific evidence-code section, the court may still refuse to admit it
if its probative value is outweighed by prejudice to the defendant1
When such prejudice exists, courts should refuse to admit such
evidence under California Evidence Code section 352.110 The
California Supreme Court has stated, "where the risk of improper use
of the hearsay outweighs its probative value as a basis for the expert
opinion it may be necessary to exclude the evidence altogether. ' ..
The Gardeley court notes that under Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE)
102. Id. at 617-18; see also Thomas R. Freeman, Guardians at the Gate: In Both Federal
and California Courts, Judicial Scrutiny Has Been Extended From Scientific to
Nonscientific Expert Testimony, L.A. LAW., Aug. 24, 2001, at 26 (discussing CAL. EVID.
CODE § 801(b)).
103. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 618.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 619.
107. Id.
108. CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2003).
109. Susan L. Burrell, Gang Evidence: Issues for Criminal Defense, 30 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 739, 764 (1990).
110. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352; see Freeman, supra note 102.
111. People v. Coleman, 38 Cal. 3d 69, 92 (1985).
[31:3
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Rule 703, "evidence admitted solely to form the basis of an expert's
opinion will not support a prima facie case.""' 2
The debate over whether expert witnesses should be allowed to
introduce hearsay evidence into the trial record is really part of a
larger question: how active should the trial court be in policing expert
testimony?"3 At trial, the judge's responsibility includes not only
deciding whether a piece of evidence is reliable proof of a fact in
issue, but also "whether the jury is likely to misuse the item as proof
of another fact.', 14 Allowing a prosecutor to elicit (or an expert to
give) a description of technically inadmissible evidence would
severely curtail judicial authority."' Such a passive approach would
mean that "rigorous application of hearsay doctrine, requiring that
the author of the underlying hearsay document be present or at least
have been cross-examined, is abandoned... 6 With the adoption of
the revised FRE 703, it is clear that the drafters did not intend to so
curb a judge's power.
Before Gardeley, California took one of the most restrictive
approaches towards admitting the basis of an expert's testimony. 7
Yet after stating the general rules governing expert testimony, the
Court in Gardeley stated: "Detective Boyd could testify as an expert
witness and could reveal the information on which he had relied in
forming his expert opinion, including hearsay.',1 8  As an expert
witness, Detective Boyd stated that the attack on Bruno was a
"'classic' example of gang-related activity."' 9 As the basis for his
expert opinion, Detective Boyd was allowed to relate to the jury
hearsay statements that incriminated Watkins and Thompson. 
120
Much of this hearsay testimony was extremely prejudicial.
112. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 619 (quoting Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness
Testimony and Federal Rules of Evidence: Insuring Adequate Assurance of
Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 66 (1986)).
113. Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859 (1992); Freeman, supra note 102.
114. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal
Rule of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447, 479 (1996).
115. Id.
116. Carlson, supra note 113, at 860.
117. Carlson, supra note 87, at 483; see also People v. Nicolous, 54 Cal. 3d 551 (1991)
(holding that while an expert may give reasons on direct for his opinions, he may not
under the guise of reasons bring before the jury incompetent hearsay).
118. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605,619 (1997).
119. Id.
120. Id.
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Detective Boyd testified that Gardeley had attempted to coerce an
independent drug dealer named Michael Haliburton to sell drugs for
the Family Crip gang.' Gardeley allegedly followed Haliburton
home, called his mother to the door, and told her to bring Haliburton
outside "so they could kill him.' ' 22 Boyd also described to the jury an
incident where Gardeley was allegedly flagging down cars in order to
make narcotics sales. The most egregious example of hearsay
testimony came when Detective Boyd testified -about the
circumstances surrounding the conviction of Mario Phipps."
Detective Boyd testified that Phipps and Thompson were involved in
a fight with members of the "415 E.P.A. Killers" gang and that
Family Crip members arrived "wearing hoods and carrying shotguns
and shot up the apartment complex.'
2 4
Ordinarily, evidence of gang membership or other prior criminal
acts is not admissible to show a defendant's bad character or criminal
propensities. 1" Even if the evidence is relevant for another reason
such as motive or intent, it may still be inadmissible if the probative
value is outweighed by prejudice to the defendant. 26 Here, though,
Detective Boyd was permitted to relate both of these stories to the
jury simply to give them the basis of his expert opinion. The obvious
effect of such evidence was to prejudice the jury against Gardeley and
Thompson. As one commentator stated:
What criminal trial lawyer has not been frustrated by an
opposing expert witness who, during direct examination, orally
dumps into the record for the jury to hear, hearsay statements
of others, the contents .of inadmissible documents .and loads of
other inadmissible evidence upon which the expert says he'relied' in forming his opinion?'
The Court declared in' a footnote that there was no reason to
decide whether Detective Boyd's expert testimony was admissible as
substantive evidence because they had already decided that the
second predicate crime did not 'have to be gang-related."2 The
121. People v. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 139-40.
124. Id.
125. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101(a) (West 2003).
126. Id. § 352; Burrell, supra note 109, at 764.
127. Carlson, supra note 113, at 868.
128. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 624 n.10 (1997).
131:3.
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California Supreme Court did not disagree with the Court of
Appeals' characterization of Detective Boyd's expert testimony.
However, the Court saw this testimony as existing solely to establish
that the second predicate crime committed by Mario Phipps was
gang-related in the sense that it was committed "for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with" the Family Crip gang.12 9
The Court makes a crucial error in not realizing that without
Detective Boyd's testimony, there is no credible evidence that Phipps
is even a member of the gang. Arguably, if the certified copy of the
abstract of judgment showing Phipps' conviction contained this
information about Phipps' gang membership, then this information
would have been established without the expert testimony.13 ° The
Court chose not to decide whether the documentary evidence of the
conviction constituted hearsay evidence when the prosecution offered
it to prove the truth of matters contained in that judgment.
131
Certainly, today after the passage of Evidence Code section 452.5, a
certified copy of conviction is admissible to prove both the fact of
conviction and also that the offense reflected in the record occurred.
132
Not all records of conviction, however, will contain the information
about which the expert testifies. For example, Phipps' record of
conviction would not necessarily specify that he was a Family Crip
gang member.
The California Supreme Court plainly stated that the required
predicate crime was satisfied by the record of conviction of "one
Mario Phipps (who Detective Boyd testified was a member of the
Family Crip gang).... Therefore, Detective Boyd's obvious
hearsay testimony was admitted substantively to prove that Phipps
was a Family Crip gang member. Even if the record of conviction was
sufficient to establish Phipps' gang membership and the required
predicate crime, then Detective Boyd's expert testimony should have
been excluded as cumulative and lacking in probative value under
California Evidence Code section 352.
Nationally, the debate over the admissibility of expert testimony
came to a head in 2000 with the adoption of revised FRE 703.'
129. Id. at 621.
130. Id. at 624.
131. Id. at 624 n.l1.
132. CAL. EVID. CODE § 425.5 (West 2003); People v. Duran, 97 Cal. App. 4th 1448,
1461 (2002).
133. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th at 624.
134. FED. R. EVID. 703 (West 2003).
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Commentators believe that FRE 703 will determine "most of the
future development of expert witness law."' 35 As revised, FRE 703
states that the bases underlying an expert's opinion shall not be
disclosed to a jury "unless the court determines that their probative
value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.' ' 36 This standard is
more restrictive than California Evidence Rule 352.7 The Advisory
Committee's note explains that Rule 703 was amended to emphasize
that "the underlying information is not admissible simply because the
opinion or inference is admitted. 1 8 It seems doubtful that Detective
Boyd's testimony would have been admissible under FRE 703.
In future cases, California courts should look to Revised FRE
703 and reaffirm their restrictive approach to expert testimony.
California courts set an important national precedent.3 9 Not only was
California the first state to pass anti-gang legislation, but California
court holdings are also used as guidance for other states'
interpretation of their own street-gang statutes."' A restrictive
approach helps to ensure that the jury has access to reliable
information while minimizing prejudice resulting from the jury's
misuse of the information. 1' Such an approach will go far toward
restoring fairness in street gang prosecutions nationwide.
VI. Confrontation Clause
While the rule governing the admissibility of expert testimony
present significant problems in civil cases, "[iln criminal cases,
misapplication of the rule can result in destruction of constitutional
rights. 1 42 Evidence that rests on hearsay statements in any important
way should be challenged under the Confrontation Clause when
offered against criminal defendants. The Sixth Amendment gives a
criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
135. Carlson, supra note 87, at 482; Imwinkelried, supra'note 114.
136. FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
137. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 ("The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by... substantial danger of undue
prejudice....")
138. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
139. Walsh & Rose, supra note 95, at 198.
140. See, e.g., State v. Lewis 514 N.W.2d 63, 68 (Iowa 1994); State v. Carillo, 623
N.W.2d 922 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
141. Richard L. Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 A Critical Modernization
for the New Century?, 52 FLA. L. REv. 715, 742-743 (2000).
142. Carlson, supra note 141, at 725.
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against him.' ' 1 3  The Confrontation Clause is a part of our Bill of
Rights and is made obligatory on the states by the 14th
Amendment.'"
Historically, the Confrontation Clause was intended to curb the
legal abuses that occurred in English criminal trials prior to the 17th
Century.' 5 The primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause was "to
prevent the trial of individuals based solely on accusations made
anonymously or by the use of ex parte depositions or affidavits.',
14 6
The Supreme Court has stated that the Confrontation Clause exists
"to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant
by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary
proceeding before the trier of fact.' ' 47 The Confrontation Clause also
serves to protect "the integrity of the adversary system."'
' "
Until 2004, Ohio v. Roberts represented the landmark guide to
Confrontation Clause analysis.' Roberts presented a general two-
prong test for determining whether a defendant's right to confront
witnesses against him was violated by hearsay testimony. The first
prong is a "rule of necessity" that mandates that "the prosecution
must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of the
declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant."''
However, Roberts indicated that unavailability "is not always
required." '52 In a footnote, the Court stated that the prosecution need
not produce a seemingly available witness "when 'the utility of trial
confrontation' is remote."'53  In more recent cases, the Court has
simply refused to apply the unavailability requirement. 5
143. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
144. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 406 (1965) (incorporating the
Confrontation Clause into the protections assured by due process, thus applying in state
courts).
145. Judge Joan Comparet-Cassani, Balancing the Anonymity of Threatened Witnesses
Versus a Defendant's Right of Confrontation: The Waiver Doctrine After Alvarado, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1165,1180 (2002).
146. Id.; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
147. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990).
148. Comparet-Cassani, supra note 145, at 1189.
149. 448 U.S. 56 (1980); see Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
150. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 65 n.7.
153. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 n.7.
154. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387
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The second prong begins once a witness has been shown to be
unavailable."' If the declarant is shown to be unavailable, then the
out-of-court testimony must have an "adequate indicia of reliability"
before it can be admitted into evidence.56 The second prong is
satisfied when "the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception" or has "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'
5 7
Firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule include former
testimony,"8 dying declarations,'59 business and public records,"'
statements made by co-conspirators,' 6' excited utterances, 62 medical
statements , and past recollection recorded.'9 In general, however, a
jury may consider hearsay evidence only if the witness is truly
unavailable and the evidence is sufficiently reliable.'
The inherent danger of "hearsay statements is that they may
have been made under circumstances subject to none of the
protections provided by the Sixth Amendment, such as cross-
examination, oath, or facial confrontation, and may thus be
unreliable."'6 However, the right of the accused to confront
witnesses against him is not absolute. The rights guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment may be waived, forfeited, or limited as any other
constitutional right. 67 As discussed, the right is subject to recognized
hearsay exceptions.'9
Although the Constitution favors a defendant's face-to-face
confrontation with the witnesses against him, the use of hearsay
evidence is not automatically a violation of the Sixth Amendment.'69
(1986).
155. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
156. Id. at 66.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 66 n.8.
159. Id.
160. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
161. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
162. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355-57 (1992).
163. Id.
164. United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603,633 (2d Cir. 1979).
165. Ruth L. Friedman, Comment, The Confrontation Clause in Search of a Paradigm:
Has Public Policy Trumped the Constitution?, 22 PACE L. REv. 455, 477 (2002); see also
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
166. Comparet-Cassani, supra note 145, at 1191-92.
167. Id. at 1191.
168. Id.; see also Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-21 (1986); White, 502 U.S. at 355.
169. Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Opinion Testimony: A
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Under Roberts, hearsay evidence that does not fit into a firmly rooted
hearsay exception may still be used if the prosecutor can demonstrate
the sufficient level of reliability. ° Often, it is difficult to predict
whether any particular piece of evidence will violate the Constitution
outside the context in which the evidence is used.'
Frustrated by this unpredictability, the Supreme Court recently
announced a transformation of its Confrontation Clause analysis.'72
Crawford v. Washington largely discards Roberts' two-pronged test
and replaces it with a "testimonial" approach to the Confrontation
Clause.' Under Crawford, the primary inquiry centers around
whether a statement is considered testimonial.' If the statement is
testimonial, and is offered to prove its truth, then it cannot be
admitted unless the defendant has an opportunity for cross-
examination.7 ' In marked contrast to Roberts, "reliability cannot be a
substitute for cross-examination."'76 Ideally this cross-examination
should occur at trial.' 77 However, if the maker of the testimonial
statement is unavailable to testify at trial, then a prior opportunity for
cross-examination may be sufficient.78
The Supreme Court neglected to provide a comprehensive
definition of which statements should be considered testimonial.79 At
the minimum, testimonial statements include "prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to
police interrogations. These are the modern practices with closest
kinship to the abuses at which the Confrontation Clause was
directed. ' is In Gardeley, the information supplied by Detective Boyd
would appear to fall within this category. Indeed, Crawford itself
involved testimony recorded by police officers during station-house
interrogations."'
Response to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 583, 595 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
173. Id. at 1374; see also Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court
Decision Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. MAG. 4 (2004).
174. 124 S. Ct. at 1365.
175. Id. at 1368.
176. Friedman, supra note 173, at 7.
177. Id.
178. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1365-66.
179. Id. at 1374.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1356-57.
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However, the Court indicated that statements that are offered
for reasons other than their truth are not considered testimonial
under Crawford.1" In Gardeley, Detective Boyd's testimony was
admitted to show the jury the basis of his expert opinion13 A danger
exists that these types of statements may not be considered
testimonial by some courts. Prosecutors should not be able to evade
a Confrontation Clause analysis simply by arguing that such evidence
is not being offered for its truth.'"
If a statement is deemed non-testimonial under Crawford, it is
unclear how a court should analyze it under the Confrontation
Clause."' Are such statements exempt from Confrontation Clause
scrutiny? Should Roberts be applied? The Court indicated that states
should be allowed "flexibility in their development of hearsay law."
'16
After Crawford, at least two courts have .proceeded to analyze
statements under Roberts after concluding that they were non-
testimonial.1" It seems likely that Roberts will continue to be used
until the Court declares that the Confrontation Clause does not apply
at all to non-testimonial statements.18
Before Crawford, at least one state found constitutional
violations caused by expert testimony. In State v. Towne, for
example, Confrontation Clause violations occurred when an expert
witness was allowed to testify that the defendant was competent.9
As a basis for his opinion, the testifying expert relied on a book
written by another, non-testifying doctor."9 The testifying expert
stated that this other doctor's opinion was "in concurrence" with his
own.1 91 The Vermont Supreme Court was not persuaded by the
prosecution's argument that the outside evidence was offered only to
show the basis for the expert testimony." The Court stated that the
admission of the non-testifying doctor's opinion violated the
182. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1369 n.9; see Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).
183. See infra Part III.
184. Friedman, supra note 173, at 7.
185. Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.
186. Id.
187. See State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191, 200-01 (Conn. 2004); People v. Coker, No.
238738, 238739, 2004 WL 626855, at *6 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).
188. Friedman, supra note 173, at 13.
189. 453 A.2d 1133, 1136 (Vt. 1982).
190. Id. at 1134.
191. Id. at 1136.
192. Id. at 1135.
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defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the
defense was prevented from cross-examining the out-of-court
declarant.'93
The Supreme Court's interest intesting reliability through cross-
examination represents a basic evidentiary dimension underlying the
Confrontation Clause.9  In this sense, the purpose of the hearsay rule
and the Confrontation Clause are parallel.9 However, one evidence
scholar has argued that the Confrontation Clause, when considered as
part of the entire Bill of Rights, functions to restrain "the capricious
use of governmental power" especially the power of the government
to convict criminal defendants using manufactured or carefully
orchestrated hearsay statements.196
This interpretation of the Bill of Rights views the Confrontation
Clause as a check against the might of government-sponsored
prosecutions. There is a potential for abuse when the government is
allowed to use evidence obtained through private interviews. "The
prosecution has the incentive and the power to shape the witness's
answers in accordance with its theory of the case."' '9  Therefore,
hearsay statements procured by the prosecution or police should be
treated differently than hearsay created without governmental
intrusion.98 In particular, hearsay statements elicited by government
agents as part of planned interviews should be excluded unless the
declarant is produced at trial."9  As the Crawford Court realized,
these types of planned custodial interviews, like the interviews of
Gardeley and Thompson, are dangerous precisely because the officer
may realize that the defendant will not testify at trial.2"
VII. Denial of Writ of Habeas Corpus
After the California Supreme Court reinstated his STEP
conviction, Gardeley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
193. Id. at 1136.
194. Eileen A. Scallen, Constitutional Dimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a
Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1992).
195. Id.
196. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation Clause: A
Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REv. 557, 559-60 (1992).
197. Berger, supra note 196, at 561.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 562, 609.
200. Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1367 n.7 (2004); Berger, supra note 196,
at 609.
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federal court in the Northern District of California."" Gardeley
asserted among other claims that the admission of hearsay evidence
in support of the STEP offense violated his Sixth Amendment rights
by denying him the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him." The court denied his petition, deferring to the
California Supreme Court's decision because it was not "contrary to,
[n]or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court precedent."20 3  The California Supreme Court's
conclusion that STEP does not require that the predicate offenses be
gang-related was binding on the federal district court.2°4 Therefore,
the federal court found that Detective Boyd's testimony was
irrelevant to Gardeley's trial and conviction."
The federal district court stated that a defendant's right to
confront witnesses through confrontation "is limited to issues relevant
to the trial."2' Since the California Supreme Court's decision that
predicate crimes did not have to be gang-related was binding, the
federal court was unable to reach the issue of whether or not
Detective Boyd's expert testimony violated Gardeley's constitutional
right to confrontation. This denial of Gardeley's petition for habeas
corpus relief only reinforces the danger caused by the California
Supreme Court's decision. If federal courts continue to be this
deferential, it is imperative that California courts take a more
exacting look at how expert testimony is being used.
If the California Supreme Court had correctly identified the
substantive use of Detective Boyd's expert testimony in Gardeley,
then the issue would have been ripe for Confrontation Clause
analysis. Detective Boyd testified that Mario Phipps was a member of
the Family Crip street gang. Either Thompson, who allegedly acted
with Phipps, or Phipps himself, had given this information to
Detective Boyd. It is also possible that this information came to
Boyd from fellow officers. Under Crawford, such substantive use of
hearsay evidence generated by police investigation should clearly be
considered testimonial. Because the defendants in Gardeley had no
201. Gardeley v. Clarke, No. C98-3832 VRW, 1999 WL 672320, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
202. Id. at *4.
203. Gardeley, No. C98-3832 VRW, 1999 WL 672320, at *6; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2002); Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 494, 500 (9th Cir. 1999).
204. Gardeley, 1999 WL 672320, at *8; see Stanton v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726, 728 (9th
Cir. 1998).
205. Gardeley, 1999 WL 672320, at *8; see United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434 (9th
Cir. 1988).
206. Gardeley, 1999 WL 672320, at *8.
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opportunity to cross-examine the sources of Detective Boyd's
information, his testimony should have been excluded.
Even under Roberts' looser standards, the basis of Detective
Boyd's expert opinion should not have been admitted. Under
Roberts, the State would have to show that the out-of-court declarant
was unavailable. In Gardeley, the State made no such showing.
Nothing was mentioned of Phipps' unavailability and there was no
indication that Thompson refused to testify on Fifth Amendment
grounds. Even if Thompson had refused to testify, the court still
should have weighed the potential for prejudice under California
Evidence Code section 352.
If unavailability were not required, the testimony would still
need to be admissible under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or its
reliability shown through some other particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness.0 7 California's evidence code does not specifically
address whether the basis of an expert's opinion could be admitted as
substantive evidence.2° In Gardeley, the California Supreme Court
cites a case that dates back to 1895 as support for allowing an expert
to describe the basis of his opinion.' °9 People v. Shattuck states that
"the party is entitled to have the reasons for the [expert's] opinion, so
the jury can estimate its value. '210 However, Shattuck does not discuss
the substantive use of such evidence.1 It is not obvious that the State
can demonstrate that such a firmly rooted hearsay exception exists.
Furthermore, police expert gang testimony has no particularized
guarantee of trustworthiness.
VIII. Police Experts
Many police departments now have specialized prosecutorial and
police gang units. Prosecutors increasingly rely on "gang experts" to
present information to the jury about gang membership, signs and
activities. These "experts" are generally police officers whose
expertise derives from their experience working in the gang unit.212
However, it is important to remember that just because an officer has
been assigned to the gang unit or has made gang-related arrests does
207. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
208. CAL. EVID. CODE § 802 (West 2003).
209. People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal. 4th 605, 618 (1997).
210. 109 Cal. 673, 679 (1895).
211. Id.
212. Burrell, supra note 109, at 770.
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not necessarily qualify that officer as an expert."' California
Evidence Code section 720(a) requires that an expert possess "special
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education" in the subject to
which his testimony relates."" Street experience does not transform
officers into behavioral scientists who can predict individual or group
behavior.""5 If challenged, these qualifications must be demonstrated
before the witness may testify as an expert. 6 As one, commentator
points out, "[rlepeated observations of an event without inquiry,
analysis, or experiment does not turn the mere observer into an
expert."
211
When police officers testify as experts there exists a special
danger of prejudice to a defendant."' Many jurors believe that police
officers possess an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness." '219
The jury may believe that the officer knows information that supports
his testimony that is not presented to the jury." The police officer's
expert testimony then may be given more credence than is
warranted." However, as one commentator notes, it is important to
remember "that an officer's expertise lies in determining when a
search or arrest is justified, not in determining when a defendant
should be convicted."' A jury may misuse an officer's opinion that
the defendant was engaging in criminal behavior as substantive
evidence of the defendant's guilt."'
Like Detective Boyd's testimony, gang evidence contained in
police reports and gathered by police experts is often based on rumor
or multi-level hearsay. ' "Information entered in official gang files
may sound unimpeachable, yet mistakes are often made." 22" As
213. Id.
214. CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a) (West 2003).
215. Burrell, supra note 109, at 771 (quoting People v. Sergill, 138 Cal. App. 3d 34
(1982)).
216. CAL. EVID. CODE § 720(a).
217. Burrell, supra note 109, at 770; see People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 852-53 (1982).
218. Deon J. Nossel, Note, The Admissibility of Ultimate Issue Testimony By Law
Enforcement Officers in Criminal Trials, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 231,245-49 (1993).
219. id. at 246 (quoting United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1984)).
220. Id. at 245.
221, Nossel, supra note 218, at 245.
222. Id. at 246-47.
223. Id. at 247.
224. Burrell, supra note 109, at 767.
225. Id. at 751 (quoting a Los Angeles police detective who said, "So many people
have the same monikers that not only, do you have to know the moniker, but what gang
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defense counsel, it is important to determine the source of any
conclusory statements concerning gang membership and to move for
exclusion of testimony that is not based on personal knowledge.226
Detective Boyd based his opinion on custodial interviews with
the defendants, their co-conspirators, other gang members and fellow
officers. 227 There is nothing inherently reliable about interviews with
suspected gang members that have been arrested. It is these types of
custodial interviews that should be viewed skeptically under the
Confrontation Clause. An experienced officer like Detective Boyd
may convince a jury of the truth of his testimony based solely on his
aura of trustworthiness if the jury has no chance to judge the
credibility of the out-of-court declarant. If examined under the
Confrontation Clause, it is unlikely that such testimony would satisfy
the reliability prong.
IX. Inadequacy of Limiting Instructions
The problems of police expert testimony cannot be eliminated
through judicial limiting instructions. Judge Learned Hand once
wrote that limiting instructions are "a mental gymnastic which is
beyond, not only [the jury's] power, but anybody's else. ''22 It is
dangerous to assume that jurors can properly limit their consideration
of hearsay evidence to assess only the quality or basis of the expert's
opinion. Even if a trial judge correctly admonishes the jury that they
should not consider the basis of an expert's testimony as substantive
evidence, studies have shown that this might cause the jury to give
such evidence more weight than if they had not been instructed at
all.229 Empirical studies demonstrate that juries use background
hearsay to reach decisions, despite judicial limiting instructions.'
"Limiting instructions do not seem to prevent jurors from using
inadmissible hearsay for the truth of the hearsay assertions and may
and what clique within the gang .... You can't arbitrarily go after Gumby unless you
know what Gumby you are looking for because there might be a few Gumbies." Paul
Feldman, Gang Nicknames: Sometimes It Gets to Be Too Insane, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1985, at 11-3.).
226. Id. at 767.
227. People v. Gardeley, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
228. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932).
229. Lisa Eichhorn, Social Science Findings and the Jury's Ability to Disregard
Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 344
(1989).
230. Carlson, supra note 141, at 734-36.
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even highlight the inadmissible material., 23' Even the California
Supreme Court recognizes that in "aggravated situations" a limiting
instruction may not be an effective remedy.f 2 This danger of
prejudice caused by misuse is unacceptable.
Even the commentators who argue that the underlying data of an
expert's opinion should be admitted for the purpose of showing the
jury the basis of the expert's opinion recognize that limiting
instructions under these circumstances are "pure fiction.",233 Professor
Rice states that "instructing the jury not to accept the recited facts as
true (even though the expert did)..." is absurd.' Further, the
Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledged
that this distinction is one "most unlikely to be made by juries.""
Since limiting instructions are ineffective in preventing a jury from
using the underlying bases of an expert's opinion as substantive
evidence, the better approach is to exclude such testimony of any
underlying data not independently admissible."
X. Conclusion
In Gardeley, the California Supreme Court missed a critical
opportunity to emphasize the trial court's gatekeeping role to
vigorously screen expert testimony and exclude those opinions that
are unreliable. The court allowed the hearsay basis of a police
officer's expert opinion to be used as substantive evidence to convict
Rochelle Gardeley. This evidence would arguably have been
excluded if challenged under either Federal Rule of Evidence 703 or
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. California should use
the recent revision of Rule 703 as an opportunity to reaffirm its own
restrictive attitude toward police expert testimony.
Until California courts mandate a more active judicial
gatekeeping role, it is critically important that defense attorneys
challenge all such police expert testimony. "The burden of calling
attention to an expert's flawed bases falls squarely on trial lawyers
who must make astute and incisive decisions. ' '237 Defense counsel
231. Carlson, supra note 87, at 485; see also Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and
Hearsay, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 345 (1995).
232. People v. Coleman, 38 Cal. 3d 69, 92 (1985).
233. Rice, supra note 169, at 585-86.
234. Id. at 585.
235. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
236. Buratti, supra note 92, at 541.
237. Carlson, supra note 87, at 481.
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should continue to demand proof by sufficient and competent
evidence of an expert's qualifications and opinions.238 The ultimate
goal of the criminal justice system is defeated if judgments are
founded on a partial and speculative presentation of the facts.3
238. Burrell, supra note 109, at 772-73.
239. Comparet-Cassani, supra note 145, at 1189.
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